Guilt-Specific Processing in the Prefrontal Cortex by Wagner, Ullrich et al.
Cerebral Cortex November 2011;21:2461--2470
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhr016
Advance Access publication March 22, 2011
Guilt-Specific Processing in the Prefrontal Cortex
Ullrich Wagner1,2,3,4, Karim N’Diaye1, Thomas Ethofer1 and Patrik Vuilleumier1,2
1Department of Neuroscience, University Medical School, University of Geneva, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland, 2Swiss Center for
Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland, 3School of Psychology, University of Bangor, Gwynedd LL57
2AS, UK and 4Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Division of Mind and Brain Research, Charite´—University Medicine
Berlin, 10117 Berlin, Germany
Address correspondence to Dr Ullrich Wagner, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Division of Mind and Brain Research,
Charite´—University Medicine Berlin, Campus Charite´ Mitte, Charite´platz 1, D-10117 Berlin, Germany. Email: ullrich.wagner@charite.de.
Guilt is a central moral emotion due to its inherent link to norm
violations, thereby affecting both individuals and society. Further-
more, the nature and specificity of guilt is still debated in psychology
and philosophy, particularly with regard to the differential in-
volvement of self-referential representations in guilt relative to
shame. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
healthy volunteers, we identified specific brain regions associated
with guilt by comparison with the 2 most closely related emotions,
shame and sadness. To induce high emotional intensity, we used an
autobiographical memory paradigm where participants relived
during fMRI scanning situations from their own past that were
associated with strong feelings of guilt, shame, or sadness.
Compared with the control emotions, guilt episodes specifically
recruited a region of right orbitofrontal cortex, which was also highly
correlated with individual propensity to experience guilt (Trait Guilt).
Guilt-specific activity was also observed in the paracingulate
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a critical ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ region,
which overlapped with brain areas of self-referential processing
identified in an independent task. These results provide new insights
on the unique nature of guilt as a ‘‘self-conscious’’ moral emotion and
the neural bases of antisocial disorders characterized by impaired
guilt processing.
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Introduction
Human behavior is potently guided by emotional processes.
Recent psychological and neuroscientiﬁc studies indicate that
this may even be true for moral judgment and decision making,
traditionally regarded as purely cognitive processes based on
rational thinking (Damasio 1994; Greene et al. 2001; Haidt
2001). The same realization has occurred in the ﬁeld of
economics following ﬁndings that human economic decisions
are not purely rational (as predicted by traditional theories) but
also frequently depend on emotional and motivational process-
ing (Sanfey et al. 2003; Camerer and Fehr 2006). However,
although recent work in neuroscience has clearly shown that
the adherence to moral and social norms is closely linked to
emotional processes and despite tremendous advance on the
neural bases of basic emotions (such as fear and disgust; e.g.,
LeDoux 2000; Calder et al. 2001), it remains unknown how the
more complex emotions that are crucially implicated in moral
and social behavior are represented in the brain.
The most relevant emotion in this context is guilt because it
is intimately linked to social and moral norm violations (Kugler
and Jones 1992; Wallbott and Scherer 1995; Teroni and Deonna
2008). Elucidating the exact neural circuits implicated in guilt
feelings is crucial to better understand the role of guilt-related
emotions in moral decisions and moral behavior. However, it
is currently unknown which brain regions mediate the self-
conscious guilt feelings generated by one’s own social norm
violations. Clinical studies suggest a speciﬁc involvement of the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) in affective processes guiding social conduct, which
might therefore also be more speciﬁcally implicated in guilt-
related affective processing. Patients with OFC/VMPFC dys-
function (due to developmental brain anomalies or externally
caused injuries) are remarkably insensitive to social norms and
frequently display patterns of antisocial or psychopathic
behavior (Anderson et al. 1999; Blair 2007; Yang and Raine
2009). A recent analysis mathematically modeling performance
of these patients during interactive economic games suggests
that their reduced sensitivity to social norms and fairness might
be best explained by a defective parameter akin to guilt
(Krajbich et al. 2009). In fact, the lack of guilt or remorse is one
of the most striking characteristics and even a deﬁning feature
of psychopathy (Hare 1991; Lykken 1995), possibly represent-
ing a causal factor for the disregard of social and moral norms
in these individuals. However, brain lesions in such patients
always encompass relatively large areas within OFC and
VMPFC, such that their deﬁcits generally affect other emotions
than guilt as well, depending on the exact extent of damage
(Rolls 2004; Zald 2009). Any conclusion about the role of
speciﬁc prefrontal areas in guilt processing would therefore
require demonstrating a selective recruitment when healthy
subjects experience guilt feelings but not when they experi-
ence other negative emotions, such as shame and sadness,
which are less directly connected to decisions of own norm
violations (Teroni and Deonna 2008).
In addition, guilt inherently requires the anticipation of
thoughts and intentions of other persons (i.e., the victim of
one’s misconduct; Baumeister et al. 1994), an ability that is the
hallmark of ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ (ToM; Vogeley et al. 2001;
Gallagher and Frith 2003) and recruits distinct brain areas in
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), together with more
posterior regions in superior temporal sulcus (STS) and
temporoparietal junction (TPJ; Gallagher and Frith 2003; Saxe
et al. 2004; Ciaramidaro et al. 2007). Parts of this network
related to ToM might therefore also be implicated in the
appropriate processing of guilt feelings.
Here, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to pinpoint the involvement of speciﬁc prefrontal brain areas in
guilt- and other-related social emotions. To induce reliable
individual guilt feelings, we designed an autobiographical
memory paradigm that takes advantage of the fact that intense
emotions can efﬁciently be elicited by reliving strong emotional
memories from the individual past (Damasio et al. 2000; Kross
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et al. 2009). Prior to fMRI, our participants ﬁrst speciﬁed
(in a questionnaire) several events from their past that were
accompanied by strong personal guilt feelings and gave some
keywords as reminders for this event. The samewas done for the
control emotions (shame and sadness), as well as a neutral
condition. During fMRI, participants were later prompted by
their own keywords and asked to relive vividly the emotion
experienced during the target event. Unlike other paradigms
targetingmore evaluativemoral processes by asking participants
to judge hypothetical scripts of social or moral actions (e.g.,
Takahashi et al. 2004;Moll et al. 2007; Kedia et al. 2008; Takahashi
et al. 2008; Burnett et al. 2009), this procedure allows the
induction of a genuine, personally relevant feeling of guilt.
As an additional means to ascertain the speciﬁcity of guilt-
related activity in the brain, we also determined interindividual
differences in Trait Guilt (using the Guilt Inventory; Jones et al.
2000), which measures stable individual propensity to experi-
ence guilt in various situations. We predicted that any area in
OFC and VMPFC selectively activated by guilt feelings in our
group analysis may also parametrically vary in relation to the
intensity of Trait Guilt at the individual level. Such ﬁnding
would support the speciﬁc involvement of these areas in guilt,
indicating that their role is not only to react generally to
emotional events associated with guilt but directly related to
the propensity to experience guilt in corresponding situations.
Furthermore, by using shame as 1 of the 2 control emotions,
our study also aimed at contributing from a neuroscientiﬁc
perspective to a fundamental debate in psychology and phi-
losophy concerning the idiosyncratic differences between guilt
and shame (Tangney et al. 1996; Teroni and Deonna 2008). Both
of these emotions are not only thought to represent prototypes
of the ‘‘moral’’ or ‘‘self-conscious’’ emotions (Leary 2007;
Tangney et al. 2007) but also appear phenomenologically and
functionally very similar. Moreover, guilt and shame typically
tend to co-occur in many situations (Eisenberg 2000; Olthof
et al. 2000). However, a critical distinction has been proposed
between these 2 emotions with respect to the role of self-
related representations (Tangney et al. 2007). According to this
view, shame is an emotion characterized by a subjective
devaluation of the whole self, whereas guilt refers to con-
sequences of one’s own behavior that caused damage to another
person. That is, although both guilt and shame are regarded as
self-conscious in the sense of implying self-awareness of the
social and moral impact of own actions, shame has been
suspected to entail a stronger self-focus than guilt, whereas the
latter would instead rely on a representation of the other (i.e.,
the victim of own misbehavior) more strongly than shame.
Alternatively, because guilt more than shame is related to
(morally bad) own decisions for which oneself bears responsi-
bility and is therefore experienced to a greater extent as caused
by the self (Wallbott and Scherer 1995; Teroni and Deonna
2008), it may be regarded as the more self-relevant emotion. To
address this issue at the neurobiological level, we determined
brain regions differentially recruited during self-related pro-
cessing in each individual participant, by applying a ‘‘functional
localizer’’ task (Saxe et al. 2006) of self- versus other-related
processing in addition to the emotional induction scanning
session. Using these functional networks as inclusive masks for
the comparison between emotion conditions, we were able to
directly identify any overlap of activation in shame-speciﬁc and
guilt-speciﬁc networks with those brain areas recruited by
either self-referential or other-referential processing.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighteen healthy female participants (25--30 years) without any history
of psychiatric or neurological disorders participated in the study. Three
participants were excluded from analysis due to data loss resulting from
technical problems during fMRI scanning. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee at the University of Geneva, and all
participants gave informed written consent prior to participation.
Prescanning Questionnaire
About 2--3 weeks prior to scanning, participants ﬁlled in a questionnaire
to specify events from their past that were associated with strong
feelings of guilt, shame, and sadness (2 events of each type). To avoid
remote childhood experiences, instructions stated that all events
should have occurred after the age of 16-year-old. Importantly,
participants were told that they should remember different ‘‘emotional
events’’ from their life, but the labels of ‘‘guilt,’’ ‘‘shame,’’ or ‘‘sadness’’
were not explicitly mentioned in these instructions. Instead, we gave
broad 3-sentence descriptions of situations in which one of the target
emotions (guilt, shame, sadness) typically occurs and then required the
participants to remember 2 events corresponding to each of these
situations that were highly emotional. These descriptions (for details,
see Supplementary Material) were chosen on the basis of theoretical
considerations (Teroni and Deonna 2008) and behavioral pilot testing
that conﬁrmed that each situation description induced the intended
target emotion more than other emotions.
After retrieving a speciﬁc event corresponding to a situation de-
scription, participants rated on a list of emotion words (including
anger, disgust, fear, guilt, happiness, pride, relief, sadness, shame, sur-
prise) how strongly they had felt each of these emotions during this
event (on a scale from 0 to 10). To guarantee privacy, no information
about the content of the speciﬁc event had to be given, but participants
provided a few keywords to be later used as a reminder for each event
in the fMRI session. (In 3 participants, questionnaire data indicated that
one event remembered for the sadness situation description led to
higher shame rating than one event remembered for the shame
situation description, and vice versa. In these cases, the target emotions
were exchanged for the respective event pair in the subsequent fMRI
session in order to yield the strongest possible induction of each target
emotion during scanning in the respective condition.)
For all events (emotional and neutral), participants provided some
general context information and additional keywords, which were
later used as reminder cues during the fMRI session (for details, see
Supplementary Material).
Experimental Procedure during fMRI Scanning
Immediately before scanning, participants were presented again with
their own reminder cues from the questionnaire (i.e., context
information and keywords for each event) and had to conﬁrm that
reading the respective cues would remind them of the corresponding
event that had been rated in the questionnaire. This allowed us to
ensure that the personal event information provided in the previous
interview session could indeed work as an efﬁcient reminder for all
target events, even 2--3 weeks after ﬁlling in the questionnaire.
Within the scanner, 2 runswere performed, duringwhich participants
had to remember andmentally relive the emotions from all the 12 events
that they had speciﬁed in the questionnaire (2 guilt events, 2 shame
events, 2 sadness events, 2 neutral events, and 4 positive ﬁller events).
Within a run, the 12 events were relived in a pseudorandom order that
was predetermined according to the constraint that there was always
a positive ﬁller event or a neutral event between 2 negative events, and
that events referring to the same target emotion (guilt, shame, sadness)
were separated by at least 4 other intervening events.
The time line for each trial is depicted in Figure 1. Each trial began
with a slide showing for 2.5 s the target emotion label, written in upper
case letters in the center of the screen. (In contrast to the prescanning
questionnaire, it was not necessary to avoid explicit reference to
emotion terms in this phase because individual emotion ratings for
each event had already been obtained. Participants were told that we
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had selected one of their strongest emotions for each event from their
questionnaire, and that they should focus on this speciﬁc emotion
when reliving the event in the scanner. This procedure was chosen to
further ensure that the target emotion was relived as strongly as
possible during scanning.) Following the target emotion word, all
reminder cues of the corresponding event were presented for 9 s on
a single slide, followed by a 20-s reliving phase, during which a slide was
shown on the screen with the instruction ‘‘Relive the memory and in
particular the emotion.’’
After this reliving interval, participants judged the vividness of the
memory and intensity of the target emotion during reliving (on a 4-
point scale, by pressing 1 of 4 keys on a response box held in their right
hand, according to verbal instruction shown on the screen: ‘‘very low’’ =
key1, ‘‘low’’ = key2, ‘‘high’’ = key3, ‘‘very high’’ = key4). An additional
rating screen asked whether the participant had been able to maintain
the target emotion during the whole reliving interval, and if not, for
how much time from the beginning of the interval they actually
maintained the emotion (according to the following instruction shown
on the screen: ‘‘0--25%’’ = key1, ‘‘25--50%’’ = key2, ‘‘50--75%’’ = key3, ‘‘75--
100%’’ = key4). This information was subsequently used to model the
duration of reliving individually in the fMRI analysis (see below). All
these ratings after the reliving phase were given in a self-paced manner
but with a maximum of 9 s for intensity and vividness and 15 s for the
questions on reliving duration estimates, which was sufﬁcient time to
exclude occurrence of missing answers in all participants.
After the ratings, a ﬁxation cross was shown for 3 s, followed by
a simple number detection task used as a cognitively and emotionally
undemanding baseline task, which also served as a distracter task to
clear the participant’s mind before the next trial began. In this task, 5
single digits randomly chosen from 1 to 9 were presented successively
at a 2-s pace in the middle of the screen, and participants had to press
a key whenever the digit ‘‘3’’ appeared. At the end of the task, a ﬁxation
cross was shown again for 3 s at the screen center to announce the
beginning of the next trial.
Participants received detailed instructions about the procedure and
the successive intervals of each trial before scanning started. Instruc-
tions emphasized that the 20-s reliving phase was the most critical
one, and that they should focus speciﬁcally on the target emotion
experienced during this event. To additionally familiarize them with the
exact timing of the procedure, an initial practice trial was performed
that did not refer to their personal events from the questionnaire (using
the terror attacks of 9/11 as an event, with the target emotion ‘‘Fear,’’ and
as reminder cues: ‘‘World Trade Center, New York’’; ‘‘11 September
2001’’; ‘‘terrorists, victims’’; ‘‘airplane,’’ ‘‘skyscraper,’’ ‘‘impact,’’ ‘‘ﬁre’’).
Self-Referential Versus Other-Referential Task
In a separate fMRI run, participants performed an additional ‘‘localizer’’
task (Saxe et al. 2006) that served to determine individual brain regions
devoted to self- versus other-referential processing. This task was
derived from a well-established experimental paradigm that allows
a comparison of patterns of brain activity associated with self-related
versus other-related representations, previously used in several neuro-
imaging studies investigating the neurobiological underpinnings of self-
referential processing (Craik et al. 1999; Kelley et al. 2002; Macrae et al.
2004). Participants read a variety of trait adjectives (taken from
a standard adjective list; Anderson 1968) and had to indicate for each of
them, in 3 separate conditions, either how well it described themselves
(=‘‘self’’ condition); how well it described their best friend (=‘‘other’’
condition); or how many syllables the adjective contained (=non-
personal control condition). Each task condition was given in blocks of
20-s duration, with 5 adjectives presented successively in each block.
There were 30 blocks altogether (10 blocks per condition), with
random order of conditions. (Before the start of each block, the cue
word ‘‘ME,’’ ‘‘FRIEND,’’ or ‘‘SYLLABLES’’ was shown for 3 s in the middle
of the screen to announce the condition for the block to the
participant.) For the purpose of the present study, the 2 critical
contrasts of self > other and other > self were used to create,
respectively, a ‘‘self-related mask’’ and an ‘‘other-related mask,’’ which
were then used to determine brain regions within emotion-speciﬁc
contrasts that overlapped with self- versus other-referential processing
(see below: ‘‘MRI acquisition and analysis’’). One of the 15 participants
did not perform this task and was therefore not included in the mask
contrasts.
Trait Guilt Questionnaire
After fMRI scanning, participants ﬁlled in the ‘‘Trait Guilt’’ scale of the
‘‘Guilt Inventory’’ (Jones et al. 2000), which assess individual propensity
to experience guilt in various situations. This personality characteristic
was used to additionally specify guilt-speciﬁc activation on the basis of
stable interindividual personality differences.
MRI Acquisition and Analysis
MRI data were acquired on a 3 T whole-body scanner (Siemens TRIO),
using standard head--coil conﬁguration. For each participant, a structural
image was obtained with a T1-weighted sequence (3D-GR/IR, repetition
time [TR] = 2300 ms, echo time [TE] = 2.89 ms, ﬂip angle = 9).
Functional images, covering the whole brain, were obtained with a
T2-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence (2D-EP, TR = 2200 ms,
TE = 30 ms, ﬂip angle = 85, voxel size = 2 3 2 3 2 mm3). For correction
of image distortions, a ﬁeldmap (36 slices, slice thickness 3 mm + 1 mm
gap, TR = 400 ms, TE [1] = 5.19 ms, TE [2] = 7.65 ms, ﬂip angle = 60,
voxel size = 3 3 3 3 4 mm3) was acquired prior to the experimental
runs.
Images were analyzed with statistical parametric mapping soft-
ware SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience; www.ﬁl.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Image preprocessing comprised realignment,
unwarping (Andersson et al. 2001), coregistration and normalization
into Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) stereotaxic space (Collins
et al. 1994), and smoothing with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum
Gaussian kernel. A high-pass frequency ﬁlter (cutoff 128 s) and
correction for autocorrelation between scans were applied to the time
series.
Statistical analysis was performed using the general linear model
implemented in SPM5, with a canonical hemodynamic response function
convolved with each modeled event. For the main experiment, separate
regressors for each emotion category (including the neutral condition
as a category) during the 20-s reliving periods and an additional regressor
for the 10-s distracter task (number detection) between the reliving
phases were deﬁned. The duration of each reliving intervals was
individually modeled according to the participants’ ratings of how long
they could maintain the target emotion during this interval (see above).
Although these ratings were generally high (average 90.0 ± 2.8% of the
interval duration [corresponding to 18.0 ± 0.6 s duration out of 20 s],
without differences between emotion conditions, P > 0.69), this
individualized duration modeling was employed to increase test power
because any fading or disruption of the target emotion in this phase
Figure 1. Time line for each trial during fMRI scanning. Our analyses compared emotion conditions (guilt, shame, sadness, neutral) in the 20 s interval of reliving (black
background). During these intervals, visual input from the monitor was exactly the same for all conditions, so that any difference in brain activation between conditions was
entirely determined by differential processes of memory-induced emotional experience. Note, width of sections is not proportional to duration of respective intervals.
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would blur the main process of interest (i.e., the speciﬁc emotion
feeling). For the self- versus other-processing task, a standard block
design was applied, with 3 separate regressors modeling each condition
(self, other, and syllable processing), with a ﬁxed duration of 20 s for each
block.
Statistical parametrical maps of blood oxygen level--dependent signal
changes were generated from linear contrasts between the different
conditions in each participant. Each emotion type (guilt, shame,
sadness) was contrasted against the neutral condition. Furthermore, to
determine brain regions of guilt-speciﬁc processing, the guilt condition
was also directly contrasted with the control emotions shame and
sadness. A second-level random effect analysis was then performed for
the entire group, using one-sample t-tests for each comparison of
interest across the whole brain. Unless stated otherwise, the standard
threshold criterion of signiﬁcant activation at a voxel level of P = 0.001
or smaller (uncorrected) was applied, with a cluster size of at least 10
voxels (Worsley et al. 1996). In addition, the critical regions in the OFC
and DMPFC identiﬁed as guilt-speciﬁc in the contrast of guilt against
the 2 control emotions, survived correction for multiple comparisons
when small volume correction (SVC) was applied with regard to
activation peaks reported in previous social--emotional and tac-
tical processing in relation to actual own interpersonal behavior
(Eisenberger et al. 2003; Fukui et al. 2006; 10 mm sphere, P < 0.05,
family-wise error correction). To specify commonalities between
emotion-speciﬁc processing and self-referential and other-referential
processing, the emotion contrasts were additionally overlaid with a self-
related mask or an other-related mask obtained from the self > other
and the other > self contrast, respectively (thresholded at P < 0.05
uncorrected, inclusive masking; Ritchey et al. 2008; Pourtois et al.
2009). Furthermore, brain activation related to interindividual differ-
ences in Trait Guilt was modeled by including individual scores on this
scale (Jones et al. 2000) as a parametric regressor into the second-level
analysis for the relevant contrasts.
Results
Behavioral Results
Mean emotion ratings for the different events reported in the
prescanning questionnaire (targeting guilt, shame, and sadness,
respectively) are shown in Table 1. These data conﬁrm that
each of the 3 situation types strongly elicited the correspond-
ing target emotion (means ± standard error of the mean [SEM]
on a scale from 0 to 10: for ‘‘guilt in ‘guilt’ situations’’ 8.1 ± 0.3;
for ‘‘shame in ‘shame’ situations’’ 7.8 ± 0.3; and for ‘‘sadness in
‘sadness’ situations’’ 7.7 ± 0.6). In addition, for all situations
types, the subjective strength of the target emotion was
signiﬁcantly higher in comparison to any other emotion felt in
the same events and in comparison to the strength of the same
emotion in the other situation types (all P < 0.05; see Table 1).
These ratings for target emotions in each situation were also
conﬁrmed by the subsequent ratings of vividness and intensity
of reliving in the scanner (see Materials and Methods), which
were generally evaluated as high (means ± SEM on a scale from
1 to 4, for vividness: guilt 3.1 ± 0.1, shame 3.0 ± 0.1, sadness
3.2 ± 0.1 and for intensity: guilt 3.0 ± 0.2, shame 2.8 ± 0.2,
sadness 3.2 ± 0.1), without signiﬁcant differences between
the emotions (all P > 0.10). Regarding nontarget emotions
additionally rated in the prescanning questionnaire, the 3
situation types did not differ, except for fear, which was judged
as stronger in shame situations than in guilt or sadness
(P < 0.05).
We also analyzed the time points when each event had
occurred. This analysis showed that all emotional events had
occurred ~3 to 4 years before experimental testing, with no
signiﬁcant difference between the 3 critical emotion condi-
tions (means ± SEM: guilt 3.5 ± 0.7 years, shame 3.2 ± 0.7 years,
sadness 4.2 ± 0.7 years; P > 0.29). However, neutral events were
generally more recent than emotional events (often occurring
a few days or weeks before the study), consistent with our
instructions that the corresponding memories had to refer to
speciﬁc events and be as vivid as emotional events. Thus,
vividness ratings for neutral events in the scanner conﬁrmed
a high vividness (3.2 ± 0.1), which did not signiﬁcantly differ
from the vividness of emotional events (P > 0.21).
fMRI Results
Separate Contrasts of Guilt and Control Emotions against the
Neutral Condition
Although the direct comparison between guilt and control
emotions was the primary topic of the present study, we ﬁrst
contrasted for explorative purposes each of the 3 target
emotions guilt, shame, and sadness, separately against the
neutral condition, allowing us to identify commonalities
between the 3 emotion conditions (Supplementary Table S1).
Consistent with task requirements, all 3 contrasts revealed a
common network (statistically conﬁrmed by conjunction
analysis performed on these 3 contrasts) comprising brain
regions critically implicated in emotional and social processing,
as well as memory retrieval and mental imagery, including in
particular the right and left retrosplenial cortex (extending into
posterior cingulate cortex [PCC] and precuneus) but also left
anterior insula, bilateral temporal poles, and lingual gyri (medial
occipital cortex), as well as the cerebellum. Notably, this shared
network also included the TPJ and anterior STS, suggesting
a common involvement of these components of the ToM system
outside the prefrontal cortex (PFC) across all 3 emotions.
Apart from these areas similarly recruited by all 3 emotions,
guilt and sadness (but not shame) showed additional activa-
tions in several other brain regions in comparison to the
neutral condition, mostly in prefrontal and temporal areas (for
details, see Supplementary Table S1).
No brain regions were more strongly activated in the neutral
than in any emotional condition (contrasts neutral > guilt,
neutral > shame, and neutral > sadness).
Direct Contrasts between Guilt and Control Emotions
With regard to our main goal, that is, to identify brain regions
speciﬁcally recruited when participants feel guilt as compared
with other closely related negative emotions, the most critical
test was the direct contrast between guilt and the 2 control
Table 1
Mean ratings (±SEM) of emotions for 3 different emotion conditions (situations relived from
personal autobiographical memories)
Emotion Guilt situation Shame situation Sadness situation
Anger 4.3 ± 0.7 4.6 ± 0.6 4.8 ± 0.7
Disgust 2.6 ± 0.7 3.0 ± 0.8 1.9 ± 0.5
Fear 4.4 ± 0.6 5.5 ± 0.6 3.6 ± 0.8
Guilt 8.1 ± 0.3* 6.0 ± 0.6 3.0 ± 0.7
Happiness 0.2 ± 0.2 0.2 ± 0.2 0.1 ± 0.1
Pride 0.4 ± 0.3 0.5 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.1
Relief 0.8 ± 0.4 1.0 ± 0.5 0.6 ± 0.3
Sadness 4.6 ± 0.6 3.5 ± 0.7 7.7 ± 0.6*
Shame 5.9 ± 0.5 7.8 ± 0.3* 1.7 ± 0.6
Surprise 1.9 ± 0.5 2.2 ± 0.7 3.2 ± 0.7
Note: Rating scale ranging from 0 to 10. Target emotions are in bold.
*P\ 0.05, for pairwise comparisons with all other values in the same column and in the same
row.
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emotions (Guilt > Shame + Sadness). This comparison revealed
guilt-speciﬁc activation in 2 prefrontal areas, namely the right
lateral OFC (xyz peak 36/32/–4) and the left paracingulate
region of the DMPFC (peak –10/42/34; Table 2).
Extraction of parameter estimates of activity (beta values)
from the cluster peak in the OFC showed that it was indeed
strongly selective in its responsiveness to guilt, with no signal
change in the other conditions (Fig. 2A; see also Supplementary
Table S2, for all separate pairwise contrasts between emotion
conditions). Furthermore, guilt speciﬁcity of this region was
additionally conﬁrmed by parametric analyses of activation
patterns between subjects, testing for any proportional in-
crease in this contrast in relation to the individual Trait Guilt
scores obtained from each participant (across the whole brain).
Again, the same right lateral OFC area was found as the only
brain region that was parametrically correlated with the degree
of individual Trait Guilt (peak 30/32/–10; Fig. 2B).
In contrast to the lateral OFC, the paracingulate DMPFC did
not show such modulation by Trait Guilt (P = 0.43). Further-
more, beta estimates and direct pairwise contrasts between
emotions for the paracingulate DMPFC cluster showed that
activation here was primarily driven by stronger guilt-related
recruitment of this region in comparison to shame rather than in
comparison to sadness (Fig. 3; Supplementary Table S2).
Emotion Contrasts Overlaid with Self- and Other-Related
Masks
Consistent with previous work using the same or similar
paradigms (Craik et al. 1999; Kelley et al. 2002; Macrae et al.
2004), the self-related mask obtained from the separate self-
referential versus other-referential task (see Materials and
Methods) basically covered the DMPFC, rostral and dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) anterior medial frontal gyrus,
anterior insula, precentral gyrus, postcentral gyrus (somato-
sensory cortex), PCC, precuneus, medial occipital gyrus, lateral
occipital gyrus, anterior mesencephalon (all bilateral), and left
thalamus, whereas the other-related mask basically included
the bilateral retrosplenial cortex, medial OFC, right inferior
frontal gyrus, bilateral superior frontal sulcus, subgenual ACC,
parts of dorsal ACC, left TPJ/angular gyrus, bilateral anterior
STS, bilateral perirhinal cortex, and right dorsal amygdala.
These masks were overlaid on the above-mentioned networks
activated by the different conditions in the emotion reliving
task, allowing us to determine whether the regions recruited
by each of these emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, sadness) were also
related to self-referential processing or to other-referential
processing (indicated by an ‘‘S’’ label or ‘‘O’’ label, respectively,
in Table 2 and Supplementary Tables S1 and S2), or unrelated to
self versus other processing. Correlation analyses of beta values
extracted in each subject for the self-condition and for the guilt
condition (with reference to the baseline) conﬁrmed a positive
association between guilt and self-referential processing in this
area (r = 0.54, P < 0.05).
Only 2 regions involved in self-related processing were
shared by all 3 emotions (compared with the neutral con-
dition), namely the left anterior insula and the medial frontal
pole (Supplementary Table S1), consistent with a more general
role of these regions in self-awareness of emotional and pain-
related processing (Price 2000; Craig 2003; Gilbert et al. 2006).
Most interestingly, an extended DMPFC area recruited by self-
referential processing was found to overlap with the para-
cingulate DMPFC region that showed a selective activation to
guilt in the direct contrast between guilt and the 2 control
emotions, shame and sadness (Table 2).
In contrast to areas within the self-related network, there
was no region associated with other-referential processing that
was not shared by all 3 emotions (Supplementary Table S1).
These shared regions included the left TPJ/angular gyrus and
anterior STS, that is, 2 critical components of the ToM network
(Gallagher and Frith 2003; Saxe 2006; Bedny et al. 2009), as well
as the retrosplenial cortex/PCC and lingual gyrus, generally
involved in emotional memory retrieval and mental imagery
(Maddock 1999; Maratos et al. 2001; Vann et al. 2009; Burianova
et al. 2010). In addition, when speciﬁcally compared with
shame, activation by guilt was found to overlap with 2 areas
that were selective for other-related processing, namely, the
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex/anterior superior frontal
gyrus and the right amygdala, a brain structure implicated in
a variety of processes of emotional and social evaluation
(Adolphs et al. 1998; LeDoux 2000; Zald 2003). Conversely,
shame evoked no speciﬁc increases compared with guilt,
neither in self- nor in other-related networks (Supplementary
Table S2).
Discussion
The present study was designed to identify the neural
substrates of guilt feelings in healthy individuals and to
determine the speciﬁcity of guilt relative to other negative or
self-conscious emotions. By using an autobiographical memory
paradigm, in which participants were prompted by private
keywords to relive highly emotional experiences from their
past (Damasio et al. 2000; Cabeza and St Jacques 2007; Kross
et al. 2009), we were able to induce strong personal guilt
feelings during fMRI. The closely related emotions shame and
sadness, likewise successfully elicited by the autobiographical
memory procedure, served as critical control conditions to
identify guilt-speciﬁc activity in the brain.
Consistent with our prediction, the results demonstrate
a crucial involvement of the OFC in guilt-related emotional
processing. Speciﬁcally, a right lateral area in OFC was acti-
vated by guilt in comparison to both sadness and shame and
therefore appears to selectively mediate those processes that
are inherent to guilt but not the other closely related emotions
shame and sadness. Furthermore, the same region was also
parametrically activated in relation to individual scores of Trait
Guilt, as measured in a separate personality questionnaire. That
is, the more participants reported being prone to experience
guilt in everyday life, the more they recruited the right OFC in
situations conceived to elicit guilt compared with other
emotional situations. Thus, a speciﬁc role of the right lateral
Table 2
Guilt-specific regions identified by direct contrast with control emotions
Anatomical definition BA Hem. S/O MNI coordinates t value Cluster
size
Guilt[ Shame þ Sadness
Lateral OFC 47 R 36 32 4 4.38 12
DMPFC/paracingulate
cortex
9/32 L S 10 42 34 4.63 10
Note: S 5 included in self-related mask, O 5 included in other-related mask. No brain regions
were activated in the opposite contrast (Shame þ Sadness[ Guilt).
P\ 0.001, uncorrected; cluster size k $ 10. BA, Brodmann area; Hem., Hemisphere.
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OFC in guilt experience was conﬁrmed by both the overall
group analysis and the correlation analysis of dispositional
differences between individuals. A second region in the DMPFC/
paracingulate cortex was also activated by guilt compared
with the control emotions but was not correlated with the
dispositional measure of Trait Guilt. In fact, apart from the right
lateral OFC, no other region in the whole-brain analysis showed
any correlation with Trait Guilt. Importantly, these results
cannot be explained by general differences in emotional
strength because vividness and intensity ratings did not differ
between the 3 emotions.
Our ﬁnding of a crucial function of the lateral OFC in
experiencing guilt converges with other observations suggest-
ing that this region is particularly involved in negative
emotional processing, unlike the more medial parts of OFC
that preferentially relate to positive, reward-related affect
(O’Doherty et al. 2001). However, the lateral OFC appears to
encode not simply negative valence in general but more
speciﬁcally the negative affect associated with particular social
contexts or expected outcomes. For example, this region was
found to be activated when participants experience social
rejection (Eisenberger et al. 2003), and results from game-
theoretical paradigms suggest that it may be responsible for
negative feeling states that determine social decision making
(Rilling et al. 2008). In the context of emotional processing,
lateral frontal areas including lateral OFC have also been
described as regions involved in inhibitory control or suppres-
sion of emotions (Beauregard et al. 2001; Ochsner et al. 2004).
However, it is very unlikely that emotion suppression could
have played any substantial role here, since emotional ratings
and direct contrasts between emotions showed no evidence
for reduced emotional responses in guilt as compared with
other conditions.
Thus, the guilt-speciﬁc activation of lateral OFC suggests
a regulatory process that is inherent to this emotion, pre-
sumably related to the control of behavior, which is necessary
to anticipate and compensate for the harm inﬂicted to another
person due to wrongdoing. Consistent with this interpretation,
a neuroimaging study by Windmann et al. (2006) found that
lateral OFC is also speciﬁcally activated when behavioral
changes are required to maximize long-term beneﬁts. Thus,
in line with the theoretical claim that guilt primarily serves to
maintain interpersonal relationships (Baumeister et al. 1994),
our results suggest that such control processes may be an
integral part of guilt feelings. Although inhibition is usually
regarded as a deliberate and effortful activity, behavioral
control by the lateral OFC could be more automatically
activated as a central component of the emotional experience
of guilt, serving to inhibit transgressions of social norms and/or
anticipate their negative outcome (for a similar account of guilt
based on developmental data, see Kochanska et al. 2009).
Our results provide an important missing link in the clinical
ﬁndings in patients with OFC lesion or dysfunction. These
patients exhibit striking abnormalities in social judgment and
behavior (Damasio 1994; Stone et al. 2002; Beer et al. 2006), and
formal mathematical models of their performance during
economic games point to a deﬁcit in guilt-related signals
(Krajbich et al. 2009). However, the latter data alone cannot
establish a selective role for the OFC in guilt feelings because
brain lesions are seldom restricted to the OFC, and a variety of
other behavioral abnormalities unrelated to guilt processing are
typically present in these patients (Bechara et al. 2000; Rolls
2004). Against this background, our data suggest that certain
antisocial features observed after OFC lesion or dysfunction may
speciﬁcally arise from an impairment of normal guilt experience.
A disturbed sense of guilt could be causally linked to an
Figure 2. Guilt-specific processing in right OFC. (A) Brain activation for guilt compared with the 2 control emotions, shame and sadness (Guilt[ Shame þ Sadness). (B)
Parameter estimates of activation (betas) extracted from the OFC cluster peak (36/32/4) for all experimental conditions. Analysis of variance indicates significantly higher
activation for guilt in comparison to all other conditions (P\ 0.05). Shame, sadness, and neutral conditions did not differ from each other (P[ 0.90). (C) Additional parametric
whole-brain analysis correlating the individual propensity to experience guilt (Trait Guilt) in the contrast Guilt[ Shame þ Sadness across subjects. This analysis independently
reveals guilt-specific processing in the same right lateral OFC region, now as a function of interindividual differences (t 5 8.56, P \ 0.0001). No additional region was
parametrically modulated by Trait Guilt in this whole-brain analysis. (D) Graphical depiction of the relationship between individual Trait Guilt scores obtained from each subject and
the corresponding extent of OFC activation in the guilt condition (beta estimates at peak voxel).
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insensitivity to own norm violations, thus leading to social
conﬂict and transgressions. Our data also support the notion that
it is indeed the OFC proper rather than the VMPFC that is
speciﬁcally involved in the affective experience of guilt,
a conclusion that would be difﬁcult to draw from clinical studies
alone because prefrontal lesions or anomalies in many cases
extend beyond OFC into more ventrally and medially neighbor-
ing areas. Moreover, although we also found evidence for guilt-
associated activation in the VMPFC/rostral ACC, this was similarly
observed for sadness, suggesting a more general role for the
VMPFC in social-affective processing than for the OFC proper.
Apart from the OFC, the only other brain area showing guilt-
speciﬁc activity was the paracingulate region of the DMPFC,
although in this case independent of the magnitude of indi-
vidual propensity to this emotion. As this region is known to
represent the primary prefrontal component of the ToM net-
work (Walter et al. 2004; Saxe 2006), this ﬁnding is consistent
with our hypothesis that guilt should recruit regions within the
ToM network more strongly than the control emotions. Due to
its direct link to social transgression causing harm to the
other(s), guilt may be inherently associated with reﬂecting and
understanding other people’s thoughts. Interestingly, however,
other areas associated with ToM (TPJ, STS) were similarly
activated by guilt, shame, and sadness in comparison with the
neutral condition, probably reﬂecting the common occurrence
of these emotions in interpersonal contexts that require
monitoring others’ thoughts and beliefs. In addition, only the
paracingulate cortex overlapped with self-related processing,
whereas the other ToM regions commonly activated by all
emotions (TPJ, STS) overlapped with other-related processing.
Other authors have similarly described the DMPFC as a key
region where self-referential processing and perspective-taking
interact (D’Argembeau et al. 2007) or where self-relevance in
interpersonal contexts is represented (Schilbach et al. 2006).
These ﬁndings therefore add to previous attempts to disentan-
gle the differential contributions of subregions within the ToM
network to different psychological processes involved in ToM
capabilities (Saxe 2006; Ciaramidaro et al. 2007; Hampton et al.
2008; Jenkins and Mitchell 2010), suggesting that the temporal
and parietal parts of this network may represent the mental
states, attributes, and/or intentions of others, while the frontal
part in the paracingulate cortex may connect these represen-
tations with those related to the self, consistent with evidence
for a particular involvement of this area in social tactics (Fukui
et al. 2006). This interpretation is in line with the recent
proposal by Saxe (2006) that the TPJ supports the human
ability to reason about the content of mental states, while the
DMPFC is involved when the self must coordinate his/her own
current goal or focus of attention with another person. Such
integration between one’s assumption about others’ thoughts
and one’s own goals is of particular relevance in guilt feelings,
where wrong actions of the self are harmful or damaging to
another person. If the DMPFC mediates the representation of
wrongdoings in relation to the relevance of inﬂicted harm for
the self or the other, an important question to address in future
studies would be whether its activation depends on personal
values or ideals endorsed by the self (more than on
conventional societal norms). Consistent with this idea, we
found that for the paracingulate DMPFC area, unlike lateral
OFC, guilt speciﬁcity was mainly driven by higher activation to
guilt situations in comparison to shame but with an in-
termediate activation to sadness. As sadness is typically most
strongly felt after the loss of a personally valued person, while
shame typically occurs as a consequence of a conﬂict with
societal conventions, these data indeed suggest that the
DMPFC is involved in social--emotional processing to the
extent that self-relevant ideals are affected.
One major advantage of the autobiographical memory
paradigm used here is that it allowed us to induce strong
individual guilt feelings genuinely linked to own norm trans-
gressions that had actually occurred. Although emotions were
induced indirectly by the reliving of respective affective
experiences from the past, without referring to the speciﬁc
emotion’s name, the subjective ratings clearly indicate that this
method of inducing the target emotions during scanning was
highly efﬁcient. In this way, our study goes beyond previous
neuroimaging experiments that focusedprimarily on judgmental
rather than affective aspects of moral processing, including
guilt-related processing, by presenting subjects during scanning
with scripts of hypothetical scenarios of prototypical social or
moral transgressions (Takahashi et al. 2004; Moll et al. 2007;
Kedia et al. 2008; Burnett et al. 2009). These studies found
activations in several brain regions associated with social
cognition, ToM, and emotional processing, generally sharedwith
other moral conditions, but critically, they did not report an
involvement of the 2 speciﬁc prefrontal regions related to guilt
here, conﬁrming our interpretation that these regions are
linked to an individual affective experience of guilt that probably
would not be induced in sufﬁcient intensity by reading
hypothetical scenarios.
Figure 3. Guilt-specific processing in the paracingulate region of the DMPFC. (A)
Activation for guilt compared with the 2 control emotions, shame and sadness
(Guilt[ Shame þ Sadness). (B) Parameter estimates of activation (betas) extracted
from the paracingulate DMPFC cluster peak (10/42/34) for all experimental
conditions. Analysis of variance indicates significantly higher activation for guilt in
comparison to shame and the neutral condition (P \ 0.01). Sadness produced
intermediate effects between neutral and guilt conditions, differing from both by trend
only (P 5 0.10 and P 5 0.12, respectively). This region also overlapped with areas
recruited during self-referential processing, as identified by a separate functional
localizer task (see text).
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An additional novel aspect of our study is that we aimed
to determine the speciﬁcity of guilt-related affective processing
by comparison with control emotions that are closely related
to guilt but less strongly linked to own norm violations. In this
way, our data critically extend the results from the only previous
neuroimaging study that used an autobiographical memory
paradigm to elicit guilt feelings during positron emission
tomography scanning but without any comparison with other
control emotions (Shin et al. 2000). These authors showed
a predominant activation in anterior insula and temporal poles
for guilt in comparison to a neutral condition but due to the
close relatedness of guilt with shame and sadness, reliving guilt
memories in their study also induced strong feelings of shame
and sadness (as conﬁrmed by emotional ratings in their own
study as well as in our study), so that this pattern of brain
activation for guilt relative to the neutral condition could also
reﬂect activation elicited by these other emotions. Our imaging
data clearly support this conclusion. When we compared guilt
with the neutral condition, we also found, among others,
activation in anterior insula and the temporal poles, as reported
by Shin et al. (2000). However, these activations were also
found when we compared shame or sadness with the neutral
condition but not in the direct contrast of guilt versus shame
and sadness. Thus, consistent with other work (Singer et al.
2004; Olson et al. 2007; Zahn et al. 2007), our results conﬁrm
that the anterior insula and temporal pole are critically involved
in social-affective processing but do not indicate any speciﬁcity
of guilt-related processing for these regions.
Another theoretical issue concerning guilt speciﬁcity, to
which the present study contributes for the ﬁrst time from a
neuroscientiﬁc perspective, pertains to a current debate within
psychology and philosophy as to what uniquely distinguishes the
2 emotions guilt and shame from each other (Tangney et al. 1996;
Olthof et al. 2000; Teroni and Deonna 2008). Because a key
aspect of this debate focuses on the notion of a differential
involvement of self- versus other-referential processing in guilt
and shame, we tested whether emotional circuits recruited by
guilt versus shame showed distinct patterns of overlap with self-
or other-related representations in the brain. Although neuro-
scientiﬁc ﬁndings cannot directly answer such theoretical
questions concerning the nature of guilt and shame, they can
contribute to the debate by providing an additional set
of information pertinent to the issue. On the basis of the
predominant theoretical assumption that self-related representa-
tions may be more strongly engaged in shame than in guilt
(Tangney et al. 2007), less overlap with brain networks activated
by self-related processing for feelings of guilt than for feelings of
shame might have been expected, but we found no support for
this expectation. In fact, while both guilt and shame, when
compared with the neutral condition, shared activations in
a number of other-related areas (including TPJ and STS within the
ToM network), several of the brain regions that were activated in
the direct comparison between guilt versus shame overlapped
with self-related processing (e.g., rostral ACC and anterior insula)
or were unrelated to the self/other distinction.
There was likewise no evidence in the opposite contrast
that shame relies more than guilt on circuits of self-related
processing. In fact, no single brain region was more strongly
activated in shame than guilt. Even in comparison to the neutral
condition, all brain areas activated by shame were also activated
by guilt. We cannot entirely exclude that the latter ﬁndings
reﬂected limited power or that self-related representations
engaged by shame involve different brain areas than those
activated during our ‘‘self-localizer’’ task. Nevertheless, our
results strongly suggest that, at the brain level, shame does not
depend on a functionally distinguishable process but rather
relies on subcircuits of the same network that is involved in the
affective processing of guilt, while guilt additionally involves
distinctive self-related representations that are not implicated in
shame. This interpretation ﬁts with a recent theoretical analysis
describing the critical difference between guilt versus shame as
emotions evoked by norm- versus value-oriented violations,
respectively (Teroni and Deonna 2008). Because social norms
are generally formalized rules on social values and behaviors,
emotional processing of social norms (as in guilt) are likely to
include emotional processing of values (as in shame) but not
necessarily vice versa.
There is to our knowledge, no similar discussion concerning
the differences between guilt and sadness, or their relation-
ship with self- and other-referential processing, although—as
demonstrated here and previously (Shin et al. 2000)—guilt-
eliciting situations tend to simultaneously trigger not only
shame but also sadness to a certain degree. The phenomeno-
logical difference between guilt and sadness is not debated, and
unlike guilt and shame, sadness is usually not regarded as a self-
conscious emotion. However, we found more neurobiological
similarities between guilt and sadness than between guilt and
shame. In fact, the right OFC was the only brain region
activated by guilt in the direct contrast with sadness, while
many other brain regions were activated when comparing guilt
with shame. Moreover, many of these brain activations in the
guilt versus shame contrast (such as the self-related areas in
rostral ACC and insula) were similarly found in the contrast of
sadness versus shame. Thus, sadness rather than shame turned
out to be a tighter control emotion for guilt, allowing us to
draw even stronger conclusions with regard to guilt-speciﬁc
brain activations than with shame alone as comparison
condition. Thus, we suggest that future studies investigating
affective guilt processing should include sadness as a relevant
comparison condition as well, rather than shame only.
In sum, we identiﬁed 2 regions in the PFC, the OFC and the
paracingulate DMPFC, as most speciﬁcally involved in experi-
encing guilt as an emotion critically connected to own actual
norm violations causing damage to other persons. Apart from
their theoretical importance within social neuroscience, our
results may ultimately also contribute in a clinical and forensic
context to a better understanding of antisocial and psycho-
pathic disorders, where the affective processing of norm
violations is impaired, frequently with legal consequences. On
a broader perspective, this research therefore also converges
with recent efforts to strengthen the links between neurosci-
ence, forensic psychology, and the law (Mobbs et al. 2007;
Gazzaniga 2008; Schleim et al. 2011).
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